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Abstract: The past two decades have witnessed an increase in interest in social mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. This paper addresses the question of what the 
components of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must be. 
Analytical sociology’s initial position and the main new proposals by analytical sociologists are discussed. 
It is argued that all of them are faced with outstanding difficulties. Subsequently, a minimal requirement 
regarding the components of social mechanisms is introduced. It is held that a component of a social 
mechanism in a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum 
phenomenon as a part of it.  
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1. Introduction  
The past two decades have witnessed an increase in interest in social mechanisms (i.e. mechanisms for 
social macro-phenomena) and mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. This increase has 
been related with the development of analytical sociology.1 Analytical sociology is a methodological 
movement within sociology that underlines the relevance of social mechanisms (Elster 1989, 2007; 
Hedström 2005; Hedström and Bearman 2009b; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010).2 Analytical sociologists 
claim that the main aim of sociology should be to explain social macro-phenomena (e.g. racial segregated 
neighbourhoods) by means of the mechanisms that are responsible for them (Hedström 2005). They also 
consider that the notion of mechanism is helpful for addressing other issues such as causation and scientific 
knowledge growth (Hedström and Ylikoski 2011). 
The aim of this paper is to address the question of what the components of social mechanisms in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must be (henceforth, “the question of components”). 
Addressing this question is crucial for the development of the mechanistic account of scientific explanation 
in social science. Mechanistic explanations must specify the mechanisms responsible for the explanandum 
phenomena, which requires identifying their components. In that kind of explanations, it is fundamental to 
detail how the components of the mechanism together give rise to the phenomenon. Consequently, knowing 
what the components of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must 
be is essential for building mechanistic explanations. Throughout the paper, in order to address the question 
of components, legitimate mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena will usually be taken 
as reference. Those explanations are one of the main guidelines for developing and evaluating potential 
 
1 In this paper, I will focus on analytical sociology, which is the main approach in the discourse on social mechanisms 
and mechanistic explanations in social science. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are several authors who have 
addressed those issues from alternative perspectives (see Bunge 1997, 2004; Tilly 2000, 2001, 2004; Abbott 2007; 
Gross 2009). 
2 For an exhaustive exposition of the emergence of analytical sociology and its relationship with previous proposals 
see (Manzo 2010). 
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answers to that question (see, for instance, Hedström and Bearman 2009a). The structure of the paper is as 
follows. Section 2 presents the fundamental principles of analytical sociology, its initial position with 
respect to the question of components, and the main critique against that position. Sections 3 and 4 analyse 
the main proposals regarding the question of components that have been raised by analytical sociologists 
after the critiques against their initial position. It is argued that they are faced with outstanding difficulties. 
Section 5 introduces a minimal requirement that must be fulfilled by components of social mechanisms in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. It is held that a component of a social mechanism in 
a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum phenomenon as 
a part of it. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The fundamental principles of analytical sociology 
A core idea of analytical sociology is the principle of mechanism-based explanations. Although analytical 
sociology is not a completely homogenous movement, all analytical sociologists support the mechanistic 
account of scientific explanation. Mechanistic explanations in sociology are proposed as an alternative to 
covering-law explanations and statistical explanations (Hedström 2005). Both covering-law and statistical 
explanations are black-box explanations.3 This kind of explanations is characterized by considering that 
either the link between explanans and explanandum is devoid of structure or its structure has no explanatory 
interest (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). They do not address the processes that would allow us to 
understand how explanans and explanandum are actually linked. 
Analytical sociologists consider that a social macro-phenomenon is explained by specifying the 
mechanism by which that phenomenon is brought about (Hedström 2005; Hedström and Bearman 2009b; 
Hedström and Ylikoski 2011). Mechanism-based explanations open up the black box that connects 
explanans and explanandum and detail the social cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the 
explanandum is produced. They oppose black-box explanations, “the mechanism should not include any 
glaring black boxes which simply give raise to additional why-questions” (Hedström 2005, p. 26). 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the notion of mechanism. Within the framework of analytical 
sociology, several notions of mechanism have been adopted (see Mahoney 2001; Hedström 2005). 
Nevertheless, all notions share some basic aspects (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). First, a mechanism is 
always a mechanism for a phenomenon. It is identified and delimited by reference to the phenomenon for 
which it is responsible. Second, a mechanism involves causal aspects. It refers to causal processes in which 
its component entities are engaged. Third, a mechanism has a structure. A mechanism consists of a 
structured constellation of entities and activities. Fourth, mechanisms are nested and form a hierarchy. A 
mechanism at one level presupposes or takes for granted certain entities and activities, but there are often 
lower-level mechanisms that account for them.  
An example of a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is Matthew J. Salganik, 
Peter Sheridan Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts’ explanation of why successful cultural products (e.g. best-
 
3 For other critiques against covering-law explanations and statistical explanations in social science see (Hedström 
2005). 
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selling books, hit songs…) are orders of magnitude more successful than average (Salganik et al. 2006; 
Salganik and Watts 2009). The authors explain this social macro-phenomenon by specifying how the 
behaviour of individuals produces it. Social influence is present in cultural markets, where information 
about the success of offered products is often available (e.g. best sellers lists). Due to the huge amount of 
offered cultural products, individuals are likely to follow others’ choices and buy those products that are 
already successful. This tendency is also reinforced by structural features of many cultural markets, such 
as giving best-selling books more prominent in-store placement. Therefore, cumulative advantage operates. 
Cultural products that are successful tend to become still more successful. Initially small differences 
become large differences and, consequently, inequality increases. In cultural markets, social influence at 
the level of individuals leads to inequality of success at the macro level. In Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ 
work, the presence of social influence in cultural markets and its contribution to inequality of success are 
supported by an experimental study in an artificial cultural market (Salganik et al. 2006). They created a 
website in which participants listened and downloaded previously unknown songs with or without 
knowledge of previous participants’ downloads. That experiment strongly suggested that individuals’ 
behaviour was influenced by others’ choices and that social influence contributed to inequality of success. 
When knowledge of previous participants’ choices (and songs’ popularity) was available, individuals were 
more likely to download popular songs (i.e. the most previously downloaded songs) than when that 
information was not available. Moreover, inequality of success was greater in the social-influence condition 
(i.e. when knowledge of previous participants’ choices was available) than in the independent condition. 
The other fundamental principle of analytical sociology is structural individualism (Hedström 2005; 
Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 2011). It is “a doctrine according to which all social facts, their structure and 
change, are in principle explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one 
another.” (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, p. 60). Structural individualism is a weak version of 
methodological individualism (Udehn 2001). It considers that social macro-phenomena must be explained 
in terms of interactions of individual agents. Individuals are the main entities and their actions are the main 
activities that give rise to social macro-phenomena. However, structural individualism admits that not all 
explanatory facts are about individuals in the strict sense. Relations and relational structures (e.g. topologies 
of social networks) may be explanatorily relevant. They influence in individuals’ behaviour and in social 
outcomes brought about. Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ (2006) explanation of inequality of success in 
cultural markets meets the requirements of structural individualism. The explanandum social macro-
phenomenon is explained in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. The authors refer 
to a social mechanism whose components are individual consumers, their properties (e.g. having certain 
taste, being influenced by others’ choices…), activities (e.g. listening, buying, downloading…), and 
relations. It should be particularly noted that their explanation includes references to relations among 
individuals and relational structures, which is the main aspect that distinguishes structural individualism 
from other versions of methodological individualism. For instance, it is specified how individuals’ choices 
are influenced by the way in which other individuals’ behaviour is showed. It is claimed that the more 
highlighted is the previous behaviour of individuals, the stronger is the effect of social influence. 
The principles of mechanism-based explanations and structural individualism are not considered 
independent. Analytical sociologists hold that the principle of mechanism-based explanations implies 
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structural individualism.4 In this sense, Hedström and Ylikoski say: “The methodological individualism of 
analytical sociology [i.e. structural individualism] is a consequence of its account of scientific explanation, 
not an independent metaphysical doctrine” (2011, p. 393). Their main argument in support of that idea is 
that there are social mechanisms only at the individual level (Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Hedström 
2005). Due to the discipline-specific relevance criteria, social mechanisms are always at the individual 
level. All social mechanisms are composed of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. Higher 
level mechanisms, which would include glaring black-boxes, and lower level mechanisms, which would 
entail an excessive decomposition of their parts, would hardly be considered relevant by social scientists. 
Consequently, demanding mechanistic explanations would mean demanding explanations in terms of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. Structural individualism would be an unavoidable 
consequence of the principle of mechanism-based explanations. According to analytical sociologists, one 
could not adopt the principle of mechanism-based explanations in sociology without accepting structural 
individualism. Supporting a mechanistic account of scientific explanation in sociology would require a 
commitment to the idea that a social macro-phenomenon must be explained in terms of interactions of 
individual agents. The commitment to structural individualism leads to an answer to the question of 
components: a social mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must be composed of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. This is the analytical sociology’s initial 
position regarding the question of components. 
In response to the analytical sociology’s initial answer to the question of components, several 
authors have disputed the idea that the principle of mechanism-based explanations implies structural 
individualism (Kincaid 2004; Mayntz 2004; Vromen 2010; Wan 2012; Kaidesoja 2013). They have argued 
that it is unlikely to be the case that all social mechanisms are at the individual level.5 Therefore, analytical 
sociologists’ main argument in support of the implication between both principles would not hold and, 
consequently, their initial position regarding the question of components would not be justified. Those 
authors claim that a mechanism for a social macro-phenomenon does not have to be exclusively composed 
of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. It must be composed of organized entities and 
activities, but those need not be only individuals, their properties, actions, and relations. Macro social 
mechanisms (i.e. social mechanisms that have components of a level higher than the individual level) are 
possible. Their component entities are either collective agents (e.g. firms, political parties, universities…) 
and individuals or just collective agents. A paradigmatic example of macro social mechanism is firms 
competing for market shares in a competitive market. It is composed of firms, their properties (e.g. 
reputation), activities (e.g. launching an advertising campaign), and relations (e.g. trade partnership). Other 
illustrative examples of macro social mechanisms would be a coalition of political parties, a conflict 
between trade unions, or states allied against an environmental problem.  
 
4 It is generally accepted that structural individualism does not imply the principle of mechanism-based explanations 
(Ylikoski 2011). Explanations of social macro-phenomena in terms of individuals’ interactions are possible even if the 
mechanisms responsible for them are not specified. 
5 This idea was originally introduced by Stinchcombe (1991) (although he understood mechanisms as abstract entities). 
Stinchcombe held that, in social mechanisms, units of analysis can be individuals, social actors, situations, or patterns 
of information. He argued that, while units of analysis are generally at a lower level than the explanandum, they do not 
need to be individuals.  
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The previously analysed discussion could be briefly summarized as follows. The two fundamental 
principles of analytical sociology are the principle of mechanism-based explanations and the structural 
individualism. Analytical sociologists consider that the principle of mechanistic explanations implies 
structural individualism because there are social mechanisms only at the individual level. The commitment 
to structural individualism leads to their initial position regarding the question of components: a social 
mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must be composed of individuals, their 
properties, actions, and relations to one another. However, as it has been argued, not all social mechanisms 
are at the level of individuals and, consequently, the principle of mechanistic explanations hardly implies 
by itself structural individualism. Therefore, the analytical sociology’s initial position would not be 
properly supported. 
Given the critiques against the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of 
components, different answers have been raised by analytical sociologists. In the next two sections, I will 
analyse the main responses: the proposal of Michael Schmid (2011), who supports the analytical 
sociology’s initial position by means of a new argument, and the proposal of Petri Ylikoski (2012), who 
defends a perspectival version of that position. It will be argued that both of them are unable to offer a 
proper answer to the question of components. 
 
3. The new argument by Schmid 
Schmid (2011) maintains the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of components. 
He claims that a social mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must be composed of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. He also adopts the principle of structural 
individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations, which leads to that position in relation to the 
question of components. However, his argument in support of that principle is not based on the idea that 
there are social mechanisms only at the individual level. He considers that mechanistic explanations of 
social macro-phenomena require mechanisms at the individual level, but he does not explicitly deny the 
existence of social mechanisms at other levels. 
Firstly, Schmid claims that one aspect of mechanism-based explanations in social science is that 
they require “laws indicating which factors ultimately ‘produce’ or ‘generate’ a relevant event” (2011, p. 
137). Specifying nomological connections is necessary in mechanistic explanations. Following the 
covering-law theory of explanation (Hempel 1965), he argues that the explanandum social macro-
phenomenon must be deduced from the explanans by means of laws. Although Schmid does not make it 
explicit, the acknowledged influence of the Hempelian approach suggests that he is understanding laws in 
a similar way as Hempel does, i.e., as true lawlike statements. And secondly, Schmid argues that we do not 
know any social law, i.e., a law governing the course of social macro-processes (e.g. a developmental law 
of society). All candidates to social laws have been proved to be false. In social sciences, only laws of 
individual action are available. Those laws address how individuals determine their actions in view of their 
established goals and subjective information. From those ideas, Schmid concludes the principle of structural 
individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations. He claims that “social phenomena may be 
regarded as having been explained only when their genesis, operation and reorganization (in the last 
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instance) is accounted for on the basis of the individual adaptive actions of individual actors” (Schmid 
2011, p. 144). Structural individualism, as it has been noted, leads to the analytical sociology’s initial 
position regarding the question of components.  
Schmid’s argument in support of the principle of structural individualism in relation to mechanism-
based explanations may be reconstructed as follows: 
(1) Mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena must include laws. 
(2) In social science, the only laws available range over individuals, their properties, actions, and 
relations. 
Mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must refer to individuals, their properties, 
actions, and relations. 
It is a valid argument. The truth of the premises supports the truth of the conclusion. If its premises were 
true, it would follow the principle of structural individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations. 
However, I think that one of the premises of the argument is probably not true. The first premise, which is 
supposed to present a trait of mechanism-based explanations, is likely to be inaccurate. Although 
subsumption under laws is a requirement in the traditional covering-law model of scientific explanation, 
mechanistic explanations are not required to include laws (Halina 2018).6 In fact, the mechanistic account 
of scientific explanation has been developed as an alternative to those accounts that require to specify laws 
(Betchel and Abrahamsen 2005; Hedström 2005). One of the main critiques against the covering-law model 
was that few or no laws are known in several fields of science (Scriven 1959). That model focuses on certain 
domains of physics, where many laws are known, and ignores the absence of laws in fields such as biology, 
sociology, economics, psychology, neuroscience, etc. The mechanistic account of scientific explanation 
aims to account for explanations in those fields where laws are not available. Therefore, not requiring to 
indicate laws is a characteristic trait of mechanism-based explanations. In a mechanistic explanation, the 
explanandum is explained by uncovering the mechanism that is responsible for it, and specifying laws is 
not required for that. It is not necessary to demonstrate that activities in which mechanisms’ component 
entities engage are according to laws.7 Those activities are often characterized just as processes that involve 
change through time (Glennan 2017) or happenings that produce changes (Machamer 2004). In fact, most 
mechanism-based explanations do not include laws. For instance, consider Michael Mann’s (2004) analysis 
of the success of European fascism in the interwar period. In his analysis, Mann addresses the property of 
certain countries (e.g. Britain, France, Sweden…) of not being susceptible to fascist movements seizing 
power. He offers a mechanism-based explanation of this social macro-property. That explanation refers to 
a mechanism whose main components are the political parties of those countries and some of their 
properties, such as subscribing “an instrumental rationality of means not ends” (Mann 2004, p. 90) and 
 
6 Karl-Dieter Opp (2005) has argued that mechanistic explanations must include laws because “[o]nly a law provides 
a selection criterion for the factors that have caused a phenomenon” (2005, p. 174) and without them the election of 
explanatorily relevant factors is arbitrary. Nevertheless, new mechanists have raised several alternative criteria of 
explanatory relevance in mechanistic explanations. For instance, Carl Craver (2007, p. 153) has introduced the 
requirement of mutual manipulability and Stuart Glennan (2017, p. 43) has proposed the requirement of contributing 
to the activity of the mechanism as a whole. 
7 In the first version of his notion of mechanism, Glennan (1996) considered that interactions among parts of 
mechanisms must be according to direct causal laws. Nevertheless, Glennan (2002, 2017) has later modified his 
characterization of interactions among mechanisms’ parts and removed that requirement. 
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being accustomed to “[c]eding sovereign powers to the opponent if electorally defeated” (Mann 2004, p. 
90). Mann shows that those properties were relevant with respect to the countries’ property of not being 
susceptible to fascist movements seizing power. Nonetheless, Mann’s explanation does not include any 
law. He does not specify a nomological connection between political parties’ properties and countries’ 
susceptibility to fascist movements seizing power. The absence of laws in mechanistic explanations is 
common to most fields of science. Paradigmatic examples of neuroscientific mechanistic explanations (e.g. 
explanation of neurotransmitter release), for example, do not include laws either (Craver 2007). 
As a matter of fact, the idea that mechanism-based explanations must include laws would not even 
be accepted by most analytical sociologists. They consider that mechanistic explanations are an alternative 
to covering-law explanations (see section 2) and do not require specifying laws. In this sense, Hedström 
and Ylikoski say: “Of course, mechanism-based explanations still rely on causal generalizations about the 
properties, activities, and relations of underlying entities, but they do not have to satisfy the traditional 
criteria for laws” (2010, p. 55). 
Summing up, Schmid adopts a conservative strategy in response to the critiques against the 
analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of components. He presents a new reasoning 
in support of that position, which is also based on the adoption of the principle of structural individualism. 
His proposal avoids the previously criticized idea that there are social mechanisms only at the individual 
level. However, his new argument in support of structural individualism is built on a very problematic 
premise: mechanistic explanations must include laws. As it has been noted, it is unlikely to be the case that 
mechanism-based explanations are required to specify laws. Schmid fails to justify the principle of 
structural individualism regarding mechanism-based explanations. Therefore, his proposal does not 
properly support the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question of components. Schmid 
does not offer a justified answer to the question of components. 
 
4. The perspectival version by Ylikoski 
Unlike Schmid, Ylikoski (2012) advocates a modified version of the analytical sociology’s initial position 
regarding the question of components. In his proposal, the initial demand of individual-level components 
is replaced by a demand of micro-level components. Micro-level components can but not need to be at the 
level of individuals. The micro level is perspectival in the sense that it is dependent on the explanatory 
target.  
Analytical sociologists usually consider that all mechanistic explanations of social macro-
phenomena are causal explanations (Hedström 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Demeulenaere 2011). 
In this sense, Hedström claims that “[t]he core idea behind the mechanism approach is that we explain […] 
by specifying mechanisms that show how phenomena are brought about” (2005, p. 24). However, Ylikoski 
(2012, 2013) has recently argued that mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena may be 
constitutive explanations too. Ylikoski considers that both causal and constitutive explanations “track 
networks of counterfactual dependence” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 34). The explanans must be a difference-maker 
with respect to the explanandum. X explains Y if Y depends on X in the sense that if X had not happened, 
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Y would have not happened either (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2013). Nevertheless, causal and constitutive 
explanations track different sort of counterfactual dependencies: “[c]ausal explanations appeal to 
etiological counterfactuals, while constitutive counterfactuals are the material for constitutive explanations” 
(Ylikoski 2013, p. 290). Although both causation and constitution are relations of dependence, there are 
relevant metaphysical differences between them. Causation is often a relation between events (i.e. changes 
in the properties of entities), takes time, and is asymmetric regarding manipulation (i.e. a change in the 
effect can be produced by manipulating the cause, but not the other way around). Constitution is often a 
relation between causal capacities (i.e. properties of entities), is synchronic, and is symmetric regarding 
manipulation (i.e. a change in the whole can be produced by manipulating a part of it, and vice versa). 
Causal explanations include parts of the causal history of the explanandum event that are causally relevant 
for it (i.e. there are causal counterfactuals that relate them), while constitutive explanations include parts of 
the system whose property is the explanandum that are constitutively relevant for it (i.e. there are 
constitutive counterfactuals that relate them). Ylikoski (2013, p. 291) considers that both causal and 
constitutive explanations can be mechanistic if they tell why and how the counterfactual dependencies hold. 
Causal mechanism-based explanations must specify the mechanism that brings about the explanandum 
event, whose components are causally relevant for it, and constitutive mechanism-based explanations must 
specify the mechanism that gives rise to the explanandum property, whose components are constitutively 
relevant for it.8 
Taking the distinction between constitutive and causal mechanism-based explanations as reference, 
Ylikoski addresses the question of components. Firstly, he focuses on constitutive mechanistic explanations 
of social macro-phenomena. Ylikoski considers that “[t]he explanantia in constitutive explanations are 
always at the micro level” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 35). Constitutive explanations aim to show how explanandum 
macro-phenomena “are constituted by micro-level entities, activities and relations” (Ylikoski 2012, p. 35). 
Consequently, he claims that the components of social mechanisms in constitutive mechanism-based 
explanations of social macro-phenomena must be located at the micro level. Secondly, Ylikoski addresses 
causal mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. He acknowledges that the explanantia in 
causal explanations are not always at the micro level. Unlike the notion of composition, “nothing in the 
notion of causation implies that the real causal work is always to be found at the micro level” (Ylikoski 
2012, p. 36). Causally relevant entities, properties, activities, and relations do not need to be at the micro 
level. For example, the marketing strategy of a courier firm is causally relevant (i.e. there are causal 
counterfactuals that relate them) for the market shares of other firms that provide courier services in the 
same area. Nevertheless, Ylikoski considers that causal mechanistic explanations of social macro-
phenomena require microfoundations. Appealing to micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations 
is essential for understanding how the explanatory counterfactual dependencies hold. Consequently, he 
argues that the components of social mechanisms in causal mechanism-based explanations of social macro-
phenomena must be located at the micro level. Ylikoski concludes that, despite their relevant differences, 
 
8 Several new mechanists (e.g. Craver 2007) consider that the explanandum of a constitutive mechanistic explanation 
is a behaviour of a system. However, Ylikoski (2013) argues that the notion of behaviour can refer to both properties 
and events, and is potentially confusing. He claims that explananda of constitutive mechanism-based explanations must 
be characterized as properties of entities.  
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in both constitutive and causal mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena, social mechanisms 
must be composed of micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations. 
Ylikoski’s proposal is less rigid than the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding the question 
of components. He holds that components of social mechanisms in mechanism-based explanations of social 
macro-phenomena must be micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations. Nonetheless, he 
considers that there is not a unique and predetermined micro level (e.g. the individual level) to which 
components of social mechanisms must always belong. The distinction between micro and macro is 
understood as a question of scale: “the difference between small- and large-scale social phenomena” 
(Ylikoski 2012, p. 27). What is considered as micro-level entities, properties, activities, and relations 
depends on the explanandum phenomenon (and the explanatory interests). A component could be 
considered micro regarding certain social phenomenon but not regarding another one. As an example, take 
into account regional governments. A regional government would be considered a micro entity regarding 
the gross domestic product of a country but not regarding the performance of town councils. Although 
micro-macro relations involve differences in scale, all differences in scale do not constitute legitimate 
micro-macro relations. For instance, between people’s literary preferences and countries’ migration policies 
there is a difference of scale, but it hardly constitutes a micro-macro relation.  Nonetheless, Ylikoski 
acknowledges that it is difficult to identify the additional traits that characterise legitimate social micro-
macro relations and differentiate them from other differences in scale. He considers that it is only possible 
to underline some traits that are often present in social micro-macro relations. For example, many social 
micro-macro relations are part-whole relationships and macro social facts are usually supra-individual. 
Ylikoski’s perspectival version avoids the main difficulty of the analytical sociology’s initial 
approach to the question of components. It is compatible with the fact that not all social mechanisms are at 
the individual level. In that proposal, it is considered that micro components of social mechanisms may be 
at different levels. Ylikoski’s approach also avoids the problem of Schmid’s argument. In it, it is not 
required that mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena include laws. Nevertheless, the 
perspectival proposal developed by Ylikoski faces some relevant difficulties.    
The main problem of Ylikoski’s proposal is that it is too vague and, consequently, does not constitute 
a proper answer to the question of components. In order to avoid the problem of the analytical sociology’s 
initial position, the requirement of individual-level components is substituted by the requirement of micro-
level components. Nevertheless, the notion of micro level is not accurately characterised. The micro-macro 
relation is defined as a particular kind of difference in scale. But the traits that characterise it and distinguish 
it from other differences in scale are not identified. It is always ambiguous whether the components of a 
social mechanism are at the micro level and meet the requirement. 
Another problematic aspect of Ylikoski’s proposal is that it does not provide a guide for building 
mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena. Firstly, as it has been noted, it is not concrete 
enough. It is never certain if a particular entity, property, activity or relation is at the micro level. And 
secondly, the identification of the micro level would require the previous specification of the explanans and 
the explanandum. In order to belong to the micro level, a component must be explanatorily relevant for the 
explanandum macro-phenomenon. In this sense, Ylikoski says: “Macro-level facts are explained by 
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appealing to micro-level processes, entities, and relations, but these items belong to the micro level just 
because they are required for the full explanation of the macro fact” (2012, p. 25). Consequently, it would 
not be possible to identify which entities, properties, activities, and relations are at the micro level before 
the development of the explanation. 
Finally, despite being less rigid than analytical sociology’ initial approach, Ylikoski’s proposal does 
not suit many mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena. In social science, causal 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-events often include causal relevant entities, properties, activities, 
or relations that are unlikely to be at the micro level. An example can be found in Aaron M. McCright and 
Riley E. Dunlap’s (2003) analysis of the conservative movement’s impact on the United States climate 
change policy. They provide a causal mechanism-based explanation of the no ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by the United States senate. Conservative movement saw the concern over global warming as 
threatening American industry, prosperity, and lifestyle. It considered that changes resulting from efforts 
to ameliorate the global warming would harm American economy. Because of those worries, conservative 
think tanks (e.g. Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation, Marshall Institute…) challenged the legitimacy of 
global warming as a problem by means of diverse strategic activities, such as publishing documents (e.g. 
policy studies), producing advertisements, presenting their global warming counter-claims to policy makers 
in Congressional hearings, and appearing on television programs. Their activities and their collaboration 
with American climate change sceptics eventually produced a redefinition of global warming as non-
problematic. That redefinition influenced in the policy arena and brought about the no ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol by the United States senate. In McCright and Dunlap’s causal mechanism-based 
explanation, most components of the social mechanism are hardly at the micro level. Firstly, there is not a 
clear difference in scale between them and the explanandum macro-phenomenon. For instance, consider 
think thanks’ challenge of the legitimacy of global warming as a problem. It does not seem reasonable to 
consider it a small-scale activity and the no ratification by the senate a large-scale phenomenon. Both are 
supra-individual events, and there is no relevant difference between them that supports that differentiation. 
And secondly, even if there was a difference in scale between them, the relation between the components 
of the mechanism and the explanandum would hardly constitute a meaningful micro-macro relation. The 
traits that usually characterise micro-macro relations are not present there. For example, there is not a part-
whole relationship between them. United States conservative movement, American network of climate 
change sceptics, and think thanks are not part of the United States senate. 
In summary, Ylikoski defends a modified version of the analytical sociology’s initial position 
regarding the question of components. The requirement of individual-level components is substituted by 
the requirement of micro-level components. He claims that components of social mechanisms in 
mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena must be micro-level entities, properties, 
activities, and relations. That proposal avoids the problems of the analytical sociology’s initial position and 
of the Schmid’s argument. Nevertheless, it faces relevant difficulties. As it has been argued, it is too vague, 
it does not provide a guide for building mechanism-based explanations, and it does not suit many causal 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. Ylikoski does not offer a satisfactory answer to the 
question of components either. 
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5. A minimal requirement 
Analytical sociologists’ proposals regarding components of social mechanisms in explanations of social 
macro-phenomena face outstanding difficulties. Nevertheless, I consider that it is possible to offer a proper 
response to the question of components. The aim of this section is to present a minimal requirement 
regarding the components of social mechanisms, which applies to both causal and constitutive mechanistic 
explanations of social macro-phenomena. 
Mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena can be causal or constitutive 
explanations (Ylikoski 2012, 2013). In a mechanistic explanation, the explanandum phenomenon is 
explained by specifying the mechanism that is responsible for it. But the relation between the explanandum 
social macro-phenomenon and the social mechanism responsible for it may be causal or constitutive. Causal 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena include parts of the causal history of the 
explanandum that are causally relevant for it, while constitutive mechanistic explanations include parts of 
the system whose property or behaviour is the explanandum that are constitutively relevant for it.  An 
example of a causal mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is Salganik, Dodds, and Watts’ 
(2006) explanation of inequality of success in cultural markets (see section 2). They specify how the 
behaviour of individual consumers, which is socially influenced, brings about that inequality. Other 
examples of causal mechanistic explanations are McCright and Dunlap’s (2003) explanation of the failure 
of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and Katherine Stovel and Christine Fountain’s (2009) 
explanation of the persistence of segregation in the labour market. An example of a constitutive mechanistic 
explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is Mann’s (2004) explanation of the property of certain 
European countries of not being susceptible to fascist movements seizing power (see section 3). He 
specifies how certain properties of the components of those countries (e.g. political parties) constituted the 
property of interest. Other examples of constitutive mechanistic explanations could be a mechanistic 
explanation of a property of a parliament (e.g. liberals having an absolute majority), and a mechanistic 
explanation of the differences in the problem-solving capacities of two groups (Ylikoski 2012).  
There is no privileged level to which components of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations 
of social macro-phenomena must always belong. Neither in causal mechanism-based explanations nor in 
constitutive mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena, must components of social 
mechanisms always be at certain fixed level. Both causally relevant components and constitutively relevant 
components may be at diverse levels. As a matter of fact, components of social mechanisms included in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena are not always at the same level. Consider Salganik, 
Dodds, and Watts’ (2006) and McCright and Dunlap’s (2003) causal mechanism-based explanations. 
Salganik, Dodds, and Watts refer to a mechanism whose components are at the individual level (e.g. 
individual consumers), while McCright and Dunlap refer to a mechanism whose main components are 
collective agents (e.g. think tanks). The same diversity can be found in constitutive mechanism-based 
explanations. Constitutive mechanistic explanations of the problem-solving capacity of a group refer to 
mechanisms whose components are at the individual level (e.g. social skills of individual members of the 
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group), while constitutive mechanistic explanations of a property of a parliament often refer to mechanisms 
whose main components are collective agents (e.g. parliamentary groups) and their properties. 
 Given this scenario, it could be considered that a proper answer to questions of components is hardly 
achievable. It seems that proposals that account for the diversity of mechanistic explanations of social 
macro-phenomena (as Ylikoski’s proposal) are too vague and unable to provide a guide for building 
mechanism-based explanations, while concrete and operational proposals (as analytical sociology’s initial 
position) do not suit the diversity of mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. Nonetheless, I 
think that a minimal requirement, which is concrete and operational without neglecting the diversity of 
mechanism-based explanations, can be raised regarding the components of social mechanisms. Particularly, 
a component of a social mechanism in a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not 
have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of it. This minimal requirement is concrete enough and 
provides a guide for building mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena. The 
identification of parts does not require the previous specification of the explanans and the explanandum. 
Moreover, the minimal requirement applies to both causal and constitutive mechanism-based explanations 
of social macro-phenomena. 
In a causal mechanism-based explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, components of the 
mechanism must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of them. In order to be a component of 
the mechanism, an entity or an activity (or another kind of component) must be causally relevant for the 
explanandum phenomenon. An entity or an activity is causally relevant for a phenomenon if there is a 
relation of causal dependence between them (i.e. there are causal counterfactuals that relate them) 
(Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2012). However, there cannot be a relation of causal dependence between an 
entity or an activity and the explanandum phenomenon if the former has the phenomenon as a part of it. A 
relation of causal dependence is not possible between a whole and one of its parts.9 It is generally agreed 
that, in a relation of causal dependence, the relata must be wholly distinct (Hitchcock 2003; Craver and 
Bechtel 2007; Ehring 2009). Causes and effects must be able to be conceived as independent existences. In 
this sense, Lewis claims: “C and E must be distinct events – and distinct not only in the sense of non-
identity but also in the sense of nonoverlap and nonimplication” (2000, p. 78). Furthermore, causal 
dependence demands certain requirements that are not satisfied in whole-part relations. For instance, the 
relation of causal dependence must be asymmetric regarding manipulation and take time (i.e. the relation 
must not be synchronic) (Craver 2007; Ylikoski 2013). Consequently, in a causal mechanism-based 
explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, an entity or an activity (or another kind of component) that has 
the explanandum phenomenon as a part of it cannot be a component of the mechanism.  
 
9 Apparent cases of whole-part (or part-whole) causal relation can be finer understood as causal interactions among 
parts associated with one or more constitutive relations (Craver and Bechtel 2007). For instance, many putative whole-
part causal relations can be analysed as a particular constellation of states of parts, which constitutes certain state of the 
whole, that causes changes in some parts. Consider, for example, the apparent causal relation between societies’ 
political polarisation and individuals’ discrimination against opposing partisans (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). A 
society’s political polarisation is constituted by the divergence of individuals’ political attitudes to ideological extremes. 
Divergence of political attitudes causes affection toward copartisans and animosity toward opposing partisans, and this 
affective separation results in discriminatory behaviour (in both political and non-political domains) toward opposing 
partisans.  
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Likewise, in a constitutive mechanism-based explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, 
components of the mechanism must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of them either. In that 
kind of explanations, components of the mechanism must be proper parts (i.e. parts that are non-identical 
to the whole) of the system whose property or behaviour is the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 2007). 
Constitutive mechanistic explanations explain the explananda by appealing to how the diverse relevant 
parts together give rise to them. Nevertheless, a component cannot be a proper part of the system whose 
property or behaviour is the explanandum phenomenon if that phenomenon is part of it. If the phenomenon 
of interest is part of a component, the system whose property or behaviour is that phenomenon is also part 
of it. For example, if the problem-solving capacity of a team is part of a certain firm, the team is also part 
of that firm. And if the system is part of the component, the component cannot be a proper part of the 
system. Something cannot be a proper part of one of its parts (e.g. a society cannot be a proper part of one 
of its members). Therefore, in a constitutive mechanism-based explanation of a social macro-phenomenon, 
an entity or an activity (or another kind of component) that has the explanandum phenomenon as a part of 
it cannot be a component of the mechanism. 
The proposed minimal requirement constitutes a proper answer to the question of components. 
Certainly, it does not identify a privileged level (e.g. the level of individuals) to which components of social 
mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must always belong. As it has been 
argued, there is no such level. Proposals that seek to identify a privileged level to which components of 
social mechanisms must always belong are doomed to failure. Nevertheless, the minimal requirement 
introduces a restriction regarding the relationship between the explanandum social macro-phenomena and 
components of social mechanisms. A component of a social mechanism in a mechanistic explanation of a 
social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of it. It should be noted 
that the proposed requirement does not demand that components of social mechanisms in mechanism-based 
explanations of a social macro-phenomena must be proper parts of the explananda. Certainly, being a 
proper part of the explanandum social macro-phenomenon is a sufficient condition to satisfy the minimal 
requirement. A component that is a proper part of the explanandum phenomenon does not have that 
phenomenon as a part. For example, consider Mann’s (2004) mechanistic explanation of the property of 
certain European countries of not being susceptible to fascist movements seizing power.  The components 
of the social mechanism indicated in the explanation (e.g. political parties’ properties), which are proper 
parts of the explanandum (i.e. countries’ properties), meet the minimal requirement. However, being a 
proper part of the explanandum social macro-phenomenon is not a necessary condition to satisfy the 
minimal requirement. A component of a social mechanism in a mechanism-based explanation may satisfy 
the minimal requirement even if it is not a proper part of the explanandum phenomenon. A component of 
a social mechanism would also meet the minimal requirement if it is not constitutively related with the 
explanandum phenomenon. A component is not constitutively related with a phenomenon if and only if 
there is no part-whole relationship between them; neither is the component part of the phenomenon nor is 
the phenomenon part of the component. For example, consider the components of a social mechanism in a 
mechanism-based explanation of a change in certain neighbourhood (e.g. a change in its racial 
composition). Components such as households that do not belong to that neighbourhood (e.g. households 
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of other neighbourhoods of the same city), which are not constitutively related with the explanandum 
phenomenon, would meet the minimal requirement. 
The proposed requirement is less restrictive than the analytical sociology’s initial position regarding 
the question of components and the Ylikoski’s perspectival version. The minimal requirement allows those 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena that suit the analytical sociology’s initial proposal or 
its perspectival version, but also other legitimate mechanistic explanations that do not suit any of them. A 
mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon that suits the analytical sociology’s initial proposal 
would surely satisfy the minimal requirement. If components of a social mechanism in an explanation of a 
social macro-phenomenon are individuals, their properties, actions, and relations, they do not have the 
explanandum macro-phenomenon as a part of them. Likewise, a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-
phenomenon that suits the Ylikoski’s proposal would satisfy the minimal requirement. If components of a 
social mechanism in an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon are at the micro level regarding it, they 
do not have the explanandum macro-phenomenon as a part of them.10 Nevertheless, the minimal 
requirement is also satisfied by other legitimate mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena 
that do not suit those proposals. For example, consider McCright and Dunlap’s (2003) explanation of the 
failure of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanistic explanation of a social macro-
phenomenon does not suit the analytical sociology’s initial proposal. It refers to a mechanism whose 
components are not just individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. Conservative 
think tanks are the main component entities of the mechanism. Moreover, as it has been showed (see section 
4), that mechanism-based explanation does not suit Ylikoki’s perspectival proposal either. It refers to a 
mechanism whose components are hardly at the micro level.  However, McCright and Dunlap’s explanation 
does meet the proposed minimal requirement. The components of the social mechanism referred by 
McCright and Dunlap (e.g. Cato Institute) do not have the explanandum phenomenon (i.e. the failure of the 
United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol) as a part of them. 
Advocates of more restrictive answers to the question of components could argue that the proposed 
minimal requirement is too broad and, consequently, ineffective. However, it is unlikely to be the case. 
Although the minimal requirement is broader than some alternative proposals (e.g. analytical sociology’s 
initial position), it is not so broad that it is ineffective. The minimal requirement introduces an effective 
restriction regarding the components of social mechanisms in mechanism-based explanations of social 
macro-phenomena. It excludes those components that have the explanandum phenomenon as part of them. 
This restriction is helpful in order to determine if an explanation of a social macro-phenomenon is a 
legitimate mechanistic explanation.11 For example, consider a mechanism-based explanation of a property 
of the city of London (e.g. a certain degree of economic inequality). If the explanation appealed to a social 
 
10 As it has been argued (see section 4), in Ylikoski’s perspectival proposal, micro-macro relations are not accurately 
characterised. Consequently, it is difficult to precisely compare that proposal with the minimal requirement. 
Nevertheless, any sensible characterisation of micro-macro relations would exclude the possibility that a macro-
phenomenon is part of a micro component. So, it is reasonable to compare both proposals in those general terms.  
11 It should be noted that failing to satisfy the minimal requirement does not necessarily mean that an explanation is 
illegitimate or lacks explanatory power. The minimal requirement aims to distinguish legitimate from non-legitimate 
mechanistic explanations. If a mechanism-based explanation does not meet the minimal requirement, it cannot be 
considered a legitimate mechanistic explanation. Nonetheless, an explanation that does not meet the minimal 
requirement could be a legitimate non-mechanistic explanation. For example, an explanation that accounts for people’s 
attitude in terms of the properties of a group to which they belong could be a legitimate non-mechanistic explanation. 
 15 
 
mechanism whose components are neighbourhoods (e.g. Chelsea), their properties, actions, and relations, 
the explanation would satisfy the minimal requirement and it could be a legitimate mechanistic explanation. 
However, if England or the United Kingdom, which have London and its properties as parts of them, were 
among the components of the appealed social mechanism, the explanation would not satisfy the minimal 
requirement and could not be a legitimate mechanistic explanation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The analytical sociology’s initial position regarding components of social mechanisms in explanations of 
social macro-phenomena is that they must be individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one 
another. After the critiques against this approach, different answers have been raised by analytical 
sociologists. Schmid (2011) has formulated a new argument in support of that initial position, while 
Ylikoski (2012) has proposed a perspectival version of it. Nevertheless, both proposals face outstanding 
difficulties. The analytical sociology’s initial position regarding components of social mechanisms should 
be given up. There is no privileged level to which components of social mechanisms in mechanistic 
explanations of social macro-phenomenon must always belong. However, a minimal requirement can be 
raised with respect to components of social mechanisms, that is, components of social mechanisms in 
mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a 
part.  
The proposed minimal requirement would considerably contribute to the development of the 
mechanistic account of scientific explanation in social science. Firstly, it offers a unified and justified 
response to the question of components. In all mechanism-based explanations of social macro-phenomena, 
components of social mechanisms must satisfy the proposed requirement. Secondly, the adoption of the 
minimal requirement would make the mechanistic account less narrow and able to account for a greater 
number of legitimate explanations. This would aid to actualize its will of broad applicability. As it has been 
noted, the mechanistic account aims to be broader than previous proposals (e.g. covering-law model) and 
suit many legitimate explanations that are excluded by them. And thirdly, the proposed minimal 
requirement provides a framework within which more specific non-individualist approaches to mechanism-
based explanations in social science could be developed. For example, it could assist the elaboration of 
actor-based approaches to causal mechanistic explanations (e.g. Ruonavaara 2012). Those approaches are 
based on the idea that causal mechanistic explanations (especially when the explanandum is an 
interdependency between social phenomena) have to be in terms of actors, which do not need to be 
individuals, and their actions and interactions. Examples of actors would be firms, residents, and political 
parties.  
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